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I . INTRODUCTION
In the current period of fiscal restraint, the acquisition
of weapon systems has come under ever increasing scrutiny.
Costs of these systems are influenced by performance
characteristics of the system and schedule demands placed on
the acquisition process . This thesis will review how the
acquisition community can trade off performance for cost and
trade off schedule for cost so as to stay within the binding
budget constraints that will exist for procurement of major
weapon systems
.
The primary focus of this thesis is to conduct a
literature review of studies and models which have been
performed in the past and to relate those to current and
future acquisitions. Specifically, this thesis attempts to
investigate how the defense acquisition community can better
use these studies to make more informed decisions regarding
the potential costs of particular tradeoff options.
A. BACKGROUND
The changing military threat to the United States and
increased attention to domestic issues have brought the
Department of Defense budget under considerable pressure.
Reductions in the budget of twenty-five percent by fiscal year
1995 are a certainty, and it is all but certain that further
reductions will be imposed. This declining budget environment
forces the Department of Defense, and particularly the
acquisition community, to make decisions on weapon systems
which will have lasting impact on both future budgets and
future capabilities. The President has highlighted this fact
with the announcement in his 1992 State of the Union address
that:
• The B-2 program will be terminated at 20 aircraft.
• The Small ICBM program will be canceled entirely.
• Production of the W-88 warhead for Trident II SLBMs will
be terminated.
• Purchases of the Advanced Cruise Missile beyond those
already authorized will cease. (Cheney, 1992, p. 20)
These cuts are in addition to the over one hundred weapon
system program terminations which have occurred in the last
two years. The cuts taken together amount to a $50 billion
savings in fiscal years 1993 through 1997. (Cheney, 1992,
p. 33) Unfortunately, decreasing or canceling procurements
will, over the long term, lead to what Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, General Powell, called a "hollow force." It is for
this reason that the Secretary of Defense stated before the
House Budget Committee that
:
The military technological revolution will continue to
pose challenges to our forces both to keep up with
competing technologies and to get the greatest potential
from the systems we have; and, that a continued and
substantial research and development effort .. .will be
required to maintain our advantage. (Cheney, 1992, p. 17)
Given that continued monies must be spent on new weapon
systems, the question then becomes how best to spend those
monies and what can be gained or lost by trading off schedule




The relationship between cost, schedule, and performance
parameters for a given weapon system is a complicated one.
Generally speaking, cost and schedule and cost and performance
are directly linked while the schedule versus performance
parameters are indirectly linked through cost. One can easily
conceptualize the link between cost as the dependent variable
and schedule as the independent variable if the performance
parameters are held constant. In this situation, as schedule
increases, overhead costs over the longer schedule will tend
to drive costs up. Alternatively, if the schedule is
compressed, more work will have to be accomplished in less
time and again it is likely that the costs will increase.
When the schedule is held constant, achieving "better"
performance will undoubtedly cost more. These relationships
imply that there is at least one point where cost is minimized
for a certain schedule and set of performance parameters . In
theory, this point is established as a result of the contract
between the government and the contractor. Moving away from
this point in any direction usually entails trading off the
design, cost, or delivery of the particular weapon system.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the conceptual
foundations of models which attempt to quantify the tradeoffs
between cost, schedule, and performance.
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
As previously mentioned, the scope of this thesis is to
investigate, through a detailed review of the literature, what
studies have been performed with respect to the tradeoffs
between cost, schedule, and performance characteristics in the
acquisition of weapon systems. The thesis attempts to answer
the questions: What studies have been performed?; What are the
cost estimating relationships (CERs) involved?; and How can
the defense acquisition community use these studies to make
informed decisions regarding particular tradeoff options?
This thesis is not intended to question strategic planning
policy nor predict future funding levels or force structures.
Nor does it attempt to measure cost versus effectiveness of a
particular weapon system.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Computerized literature searches were the primary method
for collecting information and models on the effects of cost,
schedule, and performance on weapon system acquisition.
Searches were made of the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) , Defense Technical Information
Center (DTIC) , and the National Technical Information Service
(NTIS) . A secondary method was a personal review of the Rand
Corporation yearly Indexes from 1946 through 1990. Keywords
used included combinations of the following; cost estimating
relationship, CER, weapon acquisition, weapon systems, cost
and performance, cost and schedule, and tradeoffs. The
references of relevant works found by the above methods were
also examined to complete the search.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
In order to better understand the trends that weapon
system procurement has followed, Chapter II provides a brief
discussion of the acquisition experience of the last few
decades. It also highlights some of the more important
foundations of cost estimation and their applications to
weapon systems . The remaining chapters are dedicated to
discussion of the various cost, schedule, and performance
tradeoff models, problems with their use and potential for the
future
.
Many equations with complex variables are presented in
this thesis. The confusion which surrounds the variables has
been minimized by presenting definitions in the body of the
thesis adjacent to each equation. It is hoped that the reader
will find this method more acceptable than if the definitions
were listed together in an Appendix.
Appendix A contains selected regression equations by
Alexander and Nelson for aircraft turbine engines which
supplement those in the body of the thesis. Appendix B
contains Bureau of Labor Statistics based price indices for
the years 1946 through 1973. Appendix C provides an annotated
bibliography which provides references in addition to those
cited in the body of the thesis which have either
theoretically or quantitatively described the relationship
between or among the three variables of cost, schedule, and
performance
.
II. WEAPON SYSTEM PROCUREMENT
This chapter will investigate cost and schedule growth
trends in weapon systems procurement over the last few decades
as well as discuss some of the recurring themes in the cost
estimating process. It is important to understand the
environment within which cost estimating relationships were
prepared. Thus, Chapter II sets the stage for further
discussion of specific cost, schedule, and performance models.
A. GROWTH TRENDS
Several studies have been performed which have compared
rates of cost and schedule growth at different periods in
time. One of the first was a 1972 General Accounting Office
(GAO) Report which quantified, on a large scale, the weapon
system acquisition experience. Schedule slippage was a
problem, especially for missiles, electronics, and vehicles
and ordinance systems. Figure 1 shows this schedule slippage
between the planned Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date
and the then current estimate of IOC. (GAO, 1972, p. 45)
While this figure shows growth numbers which cause some
concern, the fact is that the cost of this schedule growth was
far less than either the costs of quantity or estimating
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estimates may be at fault and therefore, relative increases in
schedule may be misleading.
A 1979 study by Rand Corporation tracked the performance,
schedule, and cost results for 1970s programs. When result to
goal ratios were calculated, the means in Table 1 were
obtained.
The figures in Table 1 are not weighted by the size of the
program budget. "When weighted by program cost, the average
cost-growth ratio for the 31 programs was about 1.14,
reflecting somewhat lower cost growth in the high-value
programs." (Dews, et al
.
, 1979, p. 26)
Reductions in development cost, development schedule,
production cost and production schedule growth rates have
generally continued into the 1980s. There is however,
conflicting data on cost and schedule growth rates,
particularly for programs in the 1970s. An Institute for
Defense Analysis Report provided the rates in Table 2 based on
42 programs during the 1970s. (Tyson, et al
.
, 1989, p. IV-2)





A cursory look at Tables 1 and 2 will reveal that there
are significant differences in what appear to be similar
measures. This demonstrates one of the problems associated
with statistically based studies. In this case, the results
are based on different samples, 31 and 42 respectively, but
the later must contain most, if not all of the former's
samples. Even with similar databases, differences in the
underlying assumptions about the data, treatment of outliers,
and specific definitions of the variables can yield different
results. This topic will be revisited later in the thesis
when specific cost models are examined.
B. COST ESTIMATION METHODS AND MODELS
The above discussion of growth trends only hints at the
various methods and models used to track and predict weapon
systems costs. Methods include analogy, bottom-up engineering
estimates, and statistical analysis. While all three are
means toward the same end, the amount of time and resources
Table 2. COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH RATES FOR 1970s PROGRAMS
MEAN
DEVELOPMENT COST GROWTH 1.26
DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE GROWTH 1.33
PRODUCTION COST GROWTH 1.63
PRODUCTION SCHEDULE GROWTH 1.73
required of each vary greatly. Analogy may have its basis in
either or both of the other two methods but it is simply an
expert's opinion, based on comparison with other similar
systems, as to what a new system should cost. Engineering
estimates require the most time and resources to complete.
They are detailed estimates at the lowest levels of the work
breakdown structure, aggregated to form an estimate of the
total system. They rely on a host of experts and managers at
all levels of an organization to estimate costs based on a
proposed design. Statistically based estimates, on the other
hand, do not necessarily require intimate knowledge of the
10
particular system to be costed. Instead, they seek to explain
cause-effect type relationships between various parameters and
some independent variable. Preparation of these models
require a moderate level of effort, particularly in the data
gathering phase. The quality of statistically based
estimating relationships is of course a function of the data
set employed. This idea will be revisited in later chapters.
The purpose for which costs are to be estimated largely
determines the method employed. The focus of this paper will
be on statistical methods which enable one to evaluate the
cost of various input alternatives.
This leads to the question—Inputs at what level?
Resources required for a weapon system can be categorized in
many different ways. Models can be created at the system,
sub-system, or cost element levels of the work breakdown
structure, by procurement phase, or some combination of both.
Each successive drop in the work breakdown structure requires
additional data which may not be comparable or even available.
Similarly, availability of downstream operating and support
and disposal costs was limited. Therefore, the studies found
in the course of research all concentrated on sub-system level





One theme which underlies the cost, schedule, and
performance tradeoff is that of technological or state-of-the-
art advance. In 1966, the conventional wisdom was that "we
simply cannot see a quantitative solution to the problem of
relating performance characteristics desired from a
development to state-of-the-art advance .
"
(Glennan, 1966, p. 9)
As a result, early attempts to place a value on this advance
were subjective estimates based on expert opinion. However,
in the early 1970s, one study related technological parameters
in aircraft turbine engines to the time to pass its 150-hour
Model Qualification Test
.
(Alexander and Nelson, 1972) This
study and further refinements have replaced subjective
evaluations with objective measurements of technological
advance. This theme will be evaluated in more detail in the
following discussion of the various models
.
D . OBJECTIVE
The underlying objective in weapon system cost estimation
is that one should be able to predict costs as a function of
the performance parameters of a system. Ideally, in terms of
minimizing cost and effort, those parameters should reflect
the performance of the system as a whole. Unfortunately, the
performance of a system is a function of design
characteristics which are inexorably linked with each other,
and with technological capabilities which impact on schedule.
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In the end, only one set of technical specifications is
selected and the system is delivered on one date. This makes
comparisons of tradeoffs difficult since one can never know
for certain what a system with different specifications would
have cost nor when it would have been delivered.
The literature linking cost, performance, and schedule is
by no means abundant. This is due in large part to the sheer
complexity of the interrelations between performance
characteristics and technical specifications as well as the
unique missions of the wide variety of weapon systems . Prior
large scale tradeoff studies have focused on the aircraft
industry. In particular, cost estimating relationships have
been studied for the airframe and turbine engine subsystems
.
One might expect that aircraft would be more widely studied
than, for example, missile systems. The technology is more
directly transferable to civilian application, pertinent data
with respect to costs and specifications are more easily
accessible, and the industrial base has been more widely
developed. More recent works on the subject typically refine
and adjust earlier studies.
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III. AIRCRAFT TURBINE ENGINE COST MODELS
This chapter will investigate the theories behind several
aircraft engine cost models and the tradeoffs between and
among the three pillars of cost, schedule, and performance.
The chapter is organized in three sections, each dealing with
a specific set of cost or schedule estimating relationships.
A. TIME VERSUS PERFORMANCE
This first section on cost models relates the performance
of aircraft turbine engines to some measure of time. Two
assumptions are necessary at this point: first, that the
engine may be described by some combination of performance
parameters and second, that the marginal increase in
performance over time displays some historical continuity
(Alexander and Nelson, 1972, p. 3). By definition, these two
assumptions must hold for essentially all parametric-based
cost estimating relationships if they are to be effective and
reliable.
When seeking to describe the performance characteristics
of a particular engine, several key factors come to the
forefront. Among these are engineering considerations such as
turbine inlet temperature, maximum thrust, weight, fuel
consumption, speed, and a pressure term. Other
characteristics which may not reflect performance include such
14
dimensions as length and diameter. None of the above
parameters explicitly brings the technical complexity of the
system nor time to develop into the equation. It is with this
foundation that Alexander and Nelson sought to quantify the
relationship between the "technology index" and some bundle of
performance parameters and physical characteristics.
1 . The Technology Index
In Measuring Technological Change: Aircraft Turbine
Engines , Alexander and Nelson defined the technology index as
number of calendar quarters (4th quarter 1942 equals one) to
achieve the 150-hour Model Qualification Test (MQT).* Their
attempt to relate performance parameters to a length of time
implicitly attempts to explain the time versus performance
tradeoff. As a result, input variables can be varied to
achieve desired results in terms of time to the 150-hour MQT,
or alternatively, time to MQT can be predicted based on a
given set of input variables.
a. Technology Trend Model
Several methodologies were used to determine the
best fit model for describing performance versus time.
Linear, quadratic, semi-logarithmic, and full logarithmic
forms were tested with the expectation that one would produce
a significantly better correlation between performance and
*The MQT is the final military qualification, after which
the engine is considered to be sufficiently developed for
installation in a production aircraft.
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time. Appendix A contains the full set of selected regression
equations cited by Alexander and Nelson. They include
equations which incorporate cruise variables
,
pure performance
variables, as well as technical parameters. Equation (1)
below shows the result of the best regression to be in the
semi-logarithmic form (Alexander and Nelson, 1972, p. 21)
:
Tech= -1187.5 +1561n(Temp) +18 . 81n (Thrust) -26.51n(Wgt)
-20.61n(SFC) +11.71n(Q) +13.0(Prop) (1)
Where
:
Tech = Quarters to MQT; (4th quarter 1942 = one)
.
Temp = Turbine inlet temperature; Degrees Rankine
.
Thrust = Military sea level static thrust; Lbs.
Wgt = Engine weight; Lbs.
SFC = Specific fuel consumption at military sea
level static thrust; (Lb/hr) /Lb thrust.
Q = Maximum dynamic pressure; lb/ ft ^2.
Prop = Dummy variable; one if turboprop, zero
otherwise
.
The R-squared value for equation (1) was reported
as .903 with a standard error of the regression of 9.6. While
the high R-squared value is impressive, the standard error of
9.6 quarters (roughly 2.4 years) implies that approximately
two thirds of future developments could be predicted within a
five year range. This is by no means satisfactory when a
project manager is faced with a decision concerning the
tradeoff between performance and schedule. However, the
incremental changes in schedule (MQT) when altering
16
performance parameters may provide a more acceptable measure
on which to base tradeoff decisions.
Jb. Revised Technology Trend Model
Nelson refined the earlier time-performance model
and related it to development and production costs of aircraft
turbine engines. This later work, entitled Relating
Technology to Acquisition Costs: Aircraft Turbine Engines ,
made extensive use of the previous data base but some
revisions require mention. Some of the more important changes
were
:
• 12 turboprop/turboshaft engines were removed because
detailed development and production costs were not
available;
• 4 engines were removed because they failed the 150-hour
MQT;
• 5 engines were removed from the military sample and
included in a commercial sample. (Nelson, 1974, p. 6)
The resultant data base consisted of twenty-six
military turbojet and turbofan engine programs plus eleven
commercial engine programs ranging from the 194 0s through the
late 1960s. Also of note were two changes made to the
performance parameters. Maximum thrust was substituted for
military sea level static thrust and a new pressure term was
introduced.* As with the previous study, a stepwise least
*This term is the product of the maximum dynamic pressure
of the flight envelope and the pressure ratio of the engine.
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squares procedure was used to determine the best fit
equations. Further, the technology index was renamed Time of
Arrival (TOA) to more accurately reflect that it is indeed a
measure of time, which substitutes for technology. Equations
(2) and (3) below are the results of the regression procedure
and they reflect the TOA for the twenty-six military engines
(TOA26 ) and the thirty-seven military and commercial engine
(TOA37 ) databases, respectively.
TOA26= -856.4 +110. llln (TEMP) +11 . 411n (TOTPRS) (2)
-26.081n(WGT) -16 . 021n (SFCMIL) +18 . 371n (THRMAX)
R2=.96 SE=6.9
TOA37= -772.85 +98 . 151n (TEMP) +11 . 971n (TOTPRS) (3)
-26.471n(WGT) -15 . 671n (SFCMIL) +19 . 041n (THRMAX)
+9.86 (MCDUM)
R2=.96 SE=6.1
where MCDUM*=military-commercial dummy (l=comm.,
0=mil.
)
The revision to the original data has led to an
increase in the coefficient of determination, but perhaps just
as importantly, it has decreased the standard error of the
estimate
.
'Other variables are as previously defined.
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B. COST VERSUS PERFORMANCE MODELS
Watts attempted to relate the cost of aircraft turbine
engines to several technical and performance parameters in his
1965 work entitled Aircraft Turbine Engines-Development and
Procurement Cost . Many of the technical parameters have been
discussed in the previous sections, however, it is necessary
at this point to define and discuss the various cost variables
used in his study. The availability of cost data is perhaps
the most binding constraint when attempting to quantify a
cost/performance relationship. There are no hard and fast
numbers like thrust or temperature which can be easily
measured (or designed) to calculate costs. Instead, the cost
estimator is forced to rely on values generated by contractor
cost accounting systems, supplemented by contract values from
government procuring agencies. Because of the incomplete data
availability at the cost element level (i.e., engineering,
production, tooling, etc.) , Watts concerned himself with costs
at the aggregate level. He divided these costs into two
categories—development and procurement--the sum of which is
total acquisition cost.
1 . Development Costs Defined
It is often difficult to distinguish where development
ends since designs are frequently subject to engineering
modifications after one or more lots have been produced.
Watts treats all product improvements over the life of the
19
system as development costs. Specifically, those production
costs include:
...initial contractor preliminary design, subsequent
engineering, prototype tooling, material, fabrication,
assembly and bench testing of scale or full-size
components or complete engines to and including
qualification testing to military acceptance
specifications. Also included is the cost of production
tooling. Afterburners or nozzles are considered as part
of the basic engine, as is the reduction gear on a
turboprop. Sustaining engineering involving factory
liaison, training, preparation of manuals, etc., are not
considered as development but as part of the production
cost. (Watts, 1965, p. 8)
Five dates at which development costs were measured
were the Preliminary Flight Rating Test (PFRT) , the MQT, and
the times of delivery of 100, 500, and 2000 engines.
2 . Procurement Costs Defined
Simply defined, the procurement cost was "the total
cost to fabricate and assemble complete engines including
labor, materials, overhead and profit." (Watts, 1965, p. 9)
Adjustments due to inflation were made using the average
hourly earnings for aircraft engines and parts production




Multivariable cost models were discarded as either
unreliable or unreasonable due to the small sample size.*




For that reason, "it was decided to relate development and
procurement cost to a single technical parameter that would
describe the size of the engine--the most obvious ones being
thrust or horsepower." (Watts, 1965, p. 40) However, quantity
was entered as a second independent variable in an attempt to
account for the difference in development costs at different
quantities
.
a. Development Cost Model
Development costs versus engine size and quantity
equations are presented below for the turbojet and turboprop
engine samples.
Turbojet: Yd.v=0 . 13937T°- 74356Q007751 (4)
R2=0.92 SE=47.25 CV=24.11%




Yd.v = cumulative development cost ($million)
T = maximum thrust (lbs)
E = equivalent shaft horsepower
Q = quantity
Jb. Procurement Cost Model
The procurement cost models were separated into
two turbojet (those with and those without afterburners) and
the turboprop categories. Results of these models were:
21
Turbojet with afterburner:
Yproc=0 . 18700T°- 84845Q-013255 (6)
R2=0.80 SE=84.78 CV=46.84%
Turbojet without afterburner:
Yproc=0.31979T°- 81626Q-° 12912 (7)
R2=0.78 SE=80.47 CV=48.92%
Turboprop:




Yproc= cumulative average cost /engine ($thousand)
c. Acquisition Cost Models
The acquisition cost model is merely the algebraic
sum of the development model and the procurement cost model
evaluated at varying quantities. Figure 2 graphically depicts
this relationship for turboprop engines at acquisition of 100,
500, and 2000 engines, respectively.
Large, in his 1970 work entitled Estimating
Aircraft Turbine Engine Costs , used Watts' work as a starting
point for developing his own cost estimates. By 1970, the
database available for study had grown to twenty-two turbojet
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Figure 2
Like Watts, Large related development costs* at
five milestones to engine performance parameters. Adjustments
were made for price-level changes and differences in quantity.
In particular, the development cost at MQT (DMQT ) equations he
found all had thrust as one explanatory variable with either
speed, altitude, or thrust per unit of outflow as the other.
The best fit equation is shown below.
DMQT=0.73F 38A109 (9)




R2=.95 SE=29 (1969 $M) * CV=14%
where
:
F= maximum thrust (thousands of lbs)
A= absolute altitude (thousands of feet)
Development costs at other quantities can be
calculated using the above equation and the development cost
ratios listed in Table 3. The ratios were based on eight
engines' total cost of development through the indicated
quantity compared to development cost through MQT
.
Table 3. DEVELOPMENT COST RATIOS
PFRT MQT 100 ENGINES 500 2000
MEAN RATIO 0.61 1 1.25 1.54 2.07
Because extrapolation between the above quantities
is rather difficult, Large added quantity to the development
cost estimating relationship. The resultant equation, shown
below, is:
DQ= 0.24F-
31A137Q 1 (1969 $M) (10)
The decrease in the R2 value to . 85 and increase
in the standard error to $52 million reflect the uncertainty
introduced by the substitution of a third explanatory
variable.
*To convert 1965 dollars to 1969 dollars, multiply 1965
dollars by 1.22. This index is based on production workers'
average earnings.
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When production costs were examined, Large states:
After duly attempting to correlate cost and every
combination of engine characteristics that appeared
reasonable or unreasonable, we believe it is fair to say
that no single or multi-variable estimating equation can
predict the cost of all engines in the sample with
acceptable accuracy (Large, 1970, p. 15)
.
As a result, the sample was broken down into three
classes based on technical design features and material
composition. Class I engines (three) all had one stage
compressors and were considered obsolete for military usage.
All four of the Class III engines had similarly large
proportions of expensive superalloys and titanium. Class II
engines contained both afterburning and non-afterburning
samples, but in general they had larger turbine inlet
temperatures than Class I, more common metals as compared to
Class III, and comparable multi-stage compressors within their
class
.
Large used the samples from Class II to determine
the regression equation which best fit those points. Parallel
lines were then hand fit to the points in Classes I and III.
Quantity was introduced as a second explanatory variable
resulting in the equation for Class II of:
Cu= 2.61F- 60Q-° 154 (11)
where C u=unit cost in thousands.
At this point, the R-squared value for Class II
engines was 0.90, the standard error was $31 thousand, and the
coefficient of variation was 14%. In order to convert unit
25
cost to cumulative average cost, unit cost was multiplied by
the quantity (1/b+l) . Simplifying further, the total cost of
development and production (CT ) for the three classes can be
summarized as follows;
Class I: CT=.24F- 31A137Q 1 + . 096F 60Q- 846 (12)
CT=27.8F 55M "Q 1 + .096F 6OQ- 846 (13)
Class II: CT=.24F- 31A137Q 1 + . 194F 60Q- 846 (14)
Ct=27.8F"M- 62Q 1 + .194F- 60Q" 846 (15)
Class III: CT=.24F- 31A137Q 1 + . 355F 60Q- 846 (16)
CT=27.8F 55M "Q 1 + .355F 60Q- 846 (17)
where M = maximum speed in Mach number and other variables are
as previously defined. The additional developmental cost
equation, incorporated into the total cost equation, provides
the estimator with two methods to better estimate a range of
likely engine costs.
Up until this point, we have presented different
models of performance versus time and cost versus performance
relationships for aircraft turbine engines. What remains now
is to link the three characteristics together so that
tradeoffs between cost, performance, and schedule may be
comparatively measured.
C. COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE MODELS
Nelson, in Relating Technology to Acquisition Costs.
Aircraft Turbine Engines validated the variables that Large
found to be important predictors of cost. However, the
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addition of the time-of-arrival variable eliminated the need
to separate engines into different classes. In effect, this
eliminated one source of variability from the total cost
equation. As with the previous cost studies, two adjustments
were made to the data--one for price level changes* and the
other for quantity and engine configuration (homogeneous
models)
.
Three different cost models were presented. They included
a standard variables model, a time-of-arrival model , and a
technology parameters model. The standard variables equation
included explanatory variables which were proven to be
important in past studies plus development time and/or
quantity. The time-of-arrival equation includes the standard
variables plus TOA and/or AToa**. The technology parameters
equation included a mixture of explanatory variables present
in the other two models.
Development cost equations were prepared for two
milestones—those costs up to MQT and total development cost.
Development cost to MQT included design, engineering, tooling,
materials, fabrication, and assembly and testing of components
and complete engines. They also include overhead and profit
since the equations predict total cost to the government.
Similarly, production costs were total cost to the government
*See Appendix B for price level adjustment factors
.
**ATOA is the difference between actual and predicted
dates of arrival at MQT.
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through Q units. Nelson used two methods to estimate
production costs. The first method involved an estimate of
the 1000th unit cost and an estimate of the slope of the
cumulative average production unit progress curve. The second
and more straightforward method predicted cost as a function
of quantity plus other explanatory variables. The former
method will be omitted because of its complexity. The
procedures do yield similarly significant results. Nelson
states
:
As an overall measure of comparability between these two
approaches, the TOA equation for unit 1000 cost and the
technology parameters equation for slope were used to
predict the costs of the 8 8 input observations for the
cumulative cost regressions. The calculated coefficient
of determination is 0.968, which compares favorably with
the R2 for the TOA cumulative production cost equation
(0.978). (Nelson, 1974, p. 49)
1 . Development Cost Models
Below are the three development-cost-to-MQT equations
presented by Nelson.
Time-of-Arrival Model:
In DMQT=-1.4461+.08538TD+.496301n THRMAX (18)
+.04 99ATOA26+.413681nMACH
R2=0.961 SE=0.182 (+20%, -1%)
Technology Parameters Model:
In DMQT=-1.5723+.07184TD+.812921n THRMAX (19)
+.58532 In MACH -.26470 In WGT
R2=0.882 SE=0.317 (+37%, -27%)
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Standard Model:
In Dhqt* -1. 0779+0. 07463TD+. 47611 In THRMAX (20)
+.5112 In MACH
R2=0.858 SE=0.329 (+39%, -28%)
where DMQT = development cost to MQT (1973 $M)
TD = development time from start to MQT (quarters)
MACH = maximum flight envelope Mach number
THRMAX = maximum thrust, sea level static (lbs)
By adding quantity into the stepwise regression




In TD$= 0.23198+1.0193 In MACH +0.06228 In Q (21)
+.442511n THRMAX +0.01418 TOTDEVTIME
R2=0.927 SE=0.209 (+23%, -19%)
Technology Parameters Model:
In TD$=-10. 485+1. 0098 In MACH +0.07119 In Q (22)
+0.43019 In WGT +1.5642 In TEMP
R2=0.930 SE=0.204 (+23%, -19%)
Standard Model
:
In TD$=0. 79747 +1.2867 In MACH +0.08146 In Q (23)
+0.398841n THRMAX
R2=0.853 SE=0.329 (+39%, -28%)
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2 . Procurement Cost Models
Cumulative production costs were based on 8 8 data
points from 18 turbojet and turbofan engines. Several items
should be noted regarding these curves and the statistical
evidence supporting them. First, since the data points are
cumulative measures of costs and quantities, there is a
potential problem with multicollinearity . As a result, errors
in the data points can not be assumed to be independent --the
effect being that the standard errors are suspect. Second,
engines with more data points will have a stronger effect on
the outcome of the regression line coefficients. The first
three production cost equations contain a dummy variable for
engine manufacturer--its value being one for Pratt & Whitney
and zero for all others. No explanation is given for the
difference in production costs between contractors. The four
procurement cost models do have R2 values greater than or
equal to 0.948 so there is the potential to estimate a
reliable range of values for procurement costs. The four
models in order of their R2 values are:
Time-of-Arrival Model with Manufacturer Dummy:
In PROC$ = -7.9854+0.92753 In Q +0.77831 In THRMAX (24)
+0.01542ATOA26F + MFRDUM +0.37779 In MACH
R2=0.978 SE=0.198 (+22%, -18%)
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Technology Parameters Model with Manufacturer Dummy:
In PROC$ = -25.130+0.86943 In Q +0.86883 In THRMAX (25)
+ MFRDUM +0.30170 In MACH +2.2107 In TEMP
R2=0.968 SE=0.235 (+27%, -21%)
Standard Model with Manufacturer Dummy:
In PROC$ = -8.5461+0.87079 In Q +0.90865 In THRMAX (26)
+ MFRDUM +0.24242 In MACH
R2=0.963 SE=0.251 (+29%, -22%)
Standard Model without Manufacturer Dummy:
In PROC$ = -7.9417+0.84172 In Q +0.84755 In THRMAX (26)
+ 0.214 62 In MACH
R2=0.948 SE=0.295 (+34%, -26%)
where PROC$ = procurement costs through Q engines (1973 $M)
ATOA26F = time-of-arrival index of last growth engine
(calendar quarters)
It should be stressed that the TOA variable, being a
function of temperature, pressure, thrust, weight, and fuel
consumption is confounded with THRMAX in equation (24) .
Similarly, any measure of time must also be confounded to some
extent with other variables in the equation. That is to say,
one can not say for sure what the real effects of time are on
the dependent variable. This is a possible explanation of why
the development time variable is linearly related to
development cost when we would intuitively expect it to be
quadratic in form. A second interpretation of this linear
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relationship is that it approximates the upward sloping right
half of the quadratic. This effect does not undermine the
values of the coefficients or the forms of the variables, but
it does affect the reliability and precision of the standard
error term.
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IV. AIRCRAFT/AIRFRAME COST ESTIMATING MODELS
Initial aircraft cost models focused on production and
generally related direct labor hours per pound to production
quantity. These plots resemble the familiar learning curve
and were of the form y=Axb . Over a period of years, the "A"
value increased significantly for fighter aircraft indicating
that it was taking more direct labor hours per pound to
complete an aircraft. When further analyzed, speed of the
aircraft was indicated as a possible explanatory variable.
A. COST VERSUS PERFORMANCE
Virtually all of the airframe cost models have both weight
and speed as explanatory variables. While speed is most
definitely a performance variable, weight seems more like a
technical variable. However, weight and particularly ratios
involving weight (i.e., thrust/weight) can also describe the
performance characteristics desired of an aircraft and
therefore it should be considered as one possible measure of
system performance.
Glennan found the following relationships* using weight
and speed as explanatory variables (Glennan, 1966, p. 8)
:
*The database consisted of the F-84, F-86, F-86D, F-89,
F-100, F-101, F-104, F-105, F-106, B-47, B-52, B-58, and F-4.
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log E 25 = .41 +.83 log W +1.97 log S (27)
log E 100 = .46 +.91 log W +1.84 log S (28)
log C25 = .72 +1.04 log W +1.42 log S (29)
where E 25 = Cost of engineering including flight test through
25 aircraft (1962 $M)
Eioo = Cost of engineering including flight test through
100 aircraft (1962 $M)
C 25 = Cost of airframe program through 25 aircraft
(1962 $M)
W = AMPR weight of aircraft (thousands of lbs)
S = Maximum speed of aircraft (Mach)
The R2 values for equations (27), (28) , and (29) are .92,
.94, and .97, respectively. However, the large range of the
dependent variable produces deviations in the 2 percent
range. Notice that the dependent variable E is an attempt to
break down costs by functional cost element. This is a result
of the databases available at the time. Also notice that the
accuracy (R2 ) of the total cost is better than the engineering
cost element. Large states;
The accuracy of the overall estimate is always better,
however, than the accuracy of the individual elements,
because the data are inconsistent at the cost-element
level. What one company calls engineering, another
company calls tooling, or a given company will change
definitions to conform to cost accounting standards, and
it has never been possible to adjust the data to eliminate
all discrepancies. [Therefore,] at the highest level--
aircraft cost--comparisons are most valid. (Large, 1981,
p. 18)
More recent total cost/performance relationships involving
weight and speed are presented below. The first, equation
(30), represents a 1976 study which contained 24 airframes.
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The second airframe relationship, equation (31), relies on a
sample of 13 post-1960 airframes which is considered to be a
better predictor of future aircraft. (Hess and Romanoff, 1987,
p. 45)
PROG 100 =6.22 AUW 728 SP 737 (30)
R2 =.88 SE = .27
PROG100 = 2.57 AUW 798 SP 736 (31)
R2 =.85 SE = .36
where PROG 100 = Cumulative total program cost for 100
aircraft (1977 $thousand)
AUW = Airframe unit weight (lb)
SP = Maximum speed (knots)
B. TIME VERSUS PERFORMANCE
The search for a technology index for aircraft roughly
paralleled that of the time-of-arrival method for turbine
engines. The natural equivalent to TOA was first flight date.
Stanley and Miller sought to quantify this technological
change in fighter aircraft in their 1979 work entitled
Measuring Technological Change in Jet Fighter Aircraft . All
combinations of linear and logarithmic variables were tested.
They determined that "the log-linear equation form
unambiguously characterized the growth in U.S. fighter
technology better than the other equation forms." (Stanley and
Miller, 1979, p. 21) They also performed several regressions
to determine from which point in time the first flight date
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would be measured. Ultimately, and after careful analysis,
January 1, 1940 was selected as the date from which first
flights would be measured. The database consisted of 25 new
designs with first flights ranging from 1946 to 1976. Six
technology equations were presented with R2 values ranging
from .945 to .882 and standard errors ranging from .117 to
.160. The first equation only is presented below:
In (t) = 3.878 + .065[ (Thrust) (V^) /lOOW^J (32)
+.406[BR/1000] +1.409[SLF/10]
+.939[PF] -.093 [carrier capability]*
where t = months since 1 JAN 1940
VIcbt = combat weight (lb)
BR = Breguet range**
SLF = Sustained load factor***
PF = Payload fraction (Max gross weight-full internal
weight divided by maximum gross weight)
The remaining five equations all contain the thrust and
velocity variables, either Breguet range or Breguet range
factor as well as some combination of payload fraction,
internal or total fuel fraction, sustained load factor, and
carrier capability.
*1 denotes no capability, denotes capability.
**The range calculated using the Breguet range equation
assuming all internal fuel is used at cruise conditions and
the aircraft is initially loaded to its maximum gross weight.
***The maximum load factor the aircraft can sustain in
level flight at an altitude of 25,000 feet and at a Mach
number of .8 at its combat weight.
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It is evident from the above definitions that both
performance and technical characteristics must be known before
equation (32) can be used. This equation truly displays the
paradox in cost estimating relationships. Namely , attempts to
locate better predictors will invariably make the equation so
cumbersome that its use as a simple estimating tool becomes
futile. Nevertheless, these somewhat obscure variables all
seek to describe some measure of output desired from an
aircraft
.
C. COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE MODELS
Only one of the following models explicitly includes some
measure of development time as an explanatory variable for
cost. However, the inclusion of a measure of time, in the
form of a technology index, does provide some foundation with
which one can attempt to trade off certain design parameters
or performance characteristics with cost and schedule.
Glennan was among the first to include some measure of
state-of-the-art advance and performance characteristics to
airframe costs. He added another variable "A" to equation
(29) which was a subjective measure of state-of-the-art
advance obtained by polling experts in the field.* He states;
Their rankings showed a high degree of consistency which
could be considered as giving us greater confidence in the
measure than if there had been little correlation between
their responses. On the other hand it might simply
'The variable "A" ranged from zero to twelve.
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indicate that they had all formed opinions based upon the
difficulty the developers had with the development.
(Glennan, 1966, p. 9)
The resultant equation for cost through 25 airframes is;
log C25 * = .89 + 1.071og W +1.45 log S -.25 log A (33)
R2 = .97
Glennan sought to obtain a more objective measure of
technology and he subsequently replaced "A" with the variable
"T" which he defined as the number of months from January 1944
to the first flight date of the aircraft. This equation is
shown below;
log C 25 = .12 + .961og W +.94 log S +.39 log T (34)
R2 = .98
Glennan noted that the coefficient for "T" "appears to
have drawn some of its statistical significance from other
factors which were changing over time and which tended to
drive development costs upward." (Glennan, 1966, p. 12) This
relates to the problem of confounding as described earlier.
In the only attempt to relate development time (D)*' and
performance to cost, Glennan found that the coefficient of
development time was never significant. This suggests, at
least based on the 13 pre-1955 aircraft samples, that changes
*Recall that C,* is measured in 1962 dollars.'25
"Arbitrarily defined as time in months from letter
contract to delivery of 25 aircraft.
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in development time do not affect costs significantly. The
equation for comparison purposes is;
log C25 = .91 +1.101og W +1.46 log S -.15 log D (35)
R2 = .97
In 1973, a J.W. Noah model was prepared for the Navy
(Large, 1981, p. 18) . It separated costs into two categories-
-recurring and non-recurring. The model contained two
subjective measures. The first, a technology index, was
essentially a time based number which rated all fighter
aircraft through the F-14. The second was a dummy variable
which held the value of zero or one depending on the
complexity of the airframe design. The remaining explanatory
variables were speed and some measure of weight. The Noah
model equations are;
C 1 = +5.945 +.00663S +.05138T -1.4071R +6.7492d (36)
C 2 = 105.05 + .11557S + 1.2034T -1.0248A +97.631d (37)
where C
x
= Non-recurring $/lb of airframe weight (thousands)
C 2 = Recurring $/lb of airframe weight (Cumulative
average cost at 100 airframes)
S = Maximum speed at altitude (knots)
T = Technical index
R = Gross takeoff weight divided by airframe weight
A = Airframe weight
d = Complexity dummy (0 or 1)
These equations do not stand alone when one has to
estimate the total cost of procurement. Since quantity is not
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explicitly defined, some characteristics of the production
learning curve must be known (or estimated) to predict total
cost. While this may not be as elegant as an equation using
quantity, it does provide the estimator with a second method
with which to evaluate program costs.
The most recent work on airframe cost estimating
relationships by Hess and Romanoff was published in 1987.
Their recommended cost model for program costs was previously
presented as equation (31) . However, they did produce
equations which incorporated a time variable. It is important
to highlight these results because they show how the form of
a cost estimating relationship can affect the outcome of a
cost estimate. Two equations are presented below--the first
with a linear incorporation of first flight date (FFD) and the
second with a logarithmic incorporation of FFD.
Linear Incorporation of FFD:
PROG 100 = 2.82 EW 802 SP 649 e 00140{FFD) (38)
R2 =.89 SE = .27
Logarithmic Incorporation of FFD:
PROG100 = .647 EW 791 SP 636 FFD 371 (39)
R2 =.8 9 SE = .27
where PROG100 = Cumulative total program cost for 100
aircraft (1977 $thousand)
EW = Empty weight (lb)
SP = Maximum speed (knots)
FFD = months since 1 January 194
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Note that the R2 value and the standard error of the
regression are identical for both forms. However, these only
explain the variance within the database. Figure 3 shows the
effect when points outside the range of the database are
estimated based on these equations.* The linear incorporation
of FFD implies an acceleration of costs over time while with
TOTAL PROGRAM COST vs. TIME





*The curves in Figure 3 are actually based on the sum of
engineering, tooling, labor, material, development support,
flight test, and quality control cost equations with the
indicated incorporation of FFD.
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the logarithmic transformation of FFD, costs remain nearly
proportional to time.
When an aircraft with an estimated FFD of 1995 is
considered, the linear incorporation of FFD produces an
estimate of program costs approximately 50 percent greater
than the equation with the logarithmic transformation. The
large variation in estimates for those aircraft with projected
first flight dates outside the range of data is a problem
common to all equations which include a measure of time as an
explanatory variable. This is of course true for any cost
estimating relationship. Any number of equation forms may
adequately represent a set of points within their range.
However, when those equations are used to predict values far
outside the range of available data, the level of uncertainty
increases. Even though we must rely on the assumption of
continuity, there must also be some subjective notion on the
likelihood of expected outcomes. Hess and Romanoff were
"unable to say which of the two FFD forms [would] more
accurately reflect future industry experience" and thus
recommend that equations incorporating the FFD variable not be
used. (Hess and Romanoff, 1987, p. 50)
One way to reduce this difference is to update the
regression equations after some period of time. Certainly, as
new aircraft are introduced, the equations can and should be
recalculated.
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V. TRADEOFFS—PROBLEMS OR PROGRESS
This thesis has attempted to compile and explain the best
models which relate performance characteristics, cost, and
schedule in the acquisition of weapon systems. The theory
that these variables are interrelated is well documented;
however, quantitative solutions involving all three are rare.
There are numerous reasons why this situation exists, however,
some progress has been made. The following sections describe
my assessment of some of the problems with quantifying
tradeoffs as well as some of the progress made in the area.
A . PROBLEMS
There are several fundamental problems with trying to
quantify the tradeoff between schedule and either cost or
performance. The following list is not intended to be
comprehensive, but rather, it highlights those problems which
have a major impact on the accuracy and applicability of
tradeoff models. Among some of the problems are:
• cost accounts and allocations






Cost accounts and allocations and database integrity and
homogeneity have been touched on in the previous chapters.
The remaining four problems are common threads which run
through the weapon acquisition cost estimating process. The
effect of each is to add a measure of uncertainty and variance
to the data which can never fully be factored out. Each of
these items will now be covered in more detail.
1 . Cost Accounts and Allocation
The desire and, in fact, need in cost estimating is to
compare apples with apples. While the cost accounting systems
imposed by the government on contractors go a long way towards
standardization, there is still substantial latitude in cost
allocation schemes. This makes inter-contractor comparison of
costs at the detailed levels more cumbersome because
differences between accounting systems can never fully be
factored out. The contractor "dummy" variables in several
equations support this idea. As we have already seen, this
results in cost estimating relationships which are generally
more accurate at the total cost level.
2 . Database Integrity and Homogeneity
In simple terms, one could say that database
integrity* and homogeneity are inversely related to
uncertainty. One can regress a non-homogenous sample to
*Integrity in this context is used to mean the degree to
which the database is suitable for accurately predicting costs
of future systems.
44
determine a relationship between two or more variables which
may potentially be very accurate for predictive purposes.
However, an estimate based on a non-homogenous sample must
also carry with it a high level of uncertainty. Similarly,
one could regress homogenous sub-samples and be just as
uncertain about a prediction because of a small number of
sample points. This is the problem with the samples described
in the previous chapters. The trend has been to incorporate
some variable (technology) which describes differences between
the sub-samples and allows the full database to be included.
Because of the use of non-homogenous samples the general goal
for accuracy has been approximately plus or minus 20 percent.
(Large, 1981, p. 28)
Creating and maintaining database homogeneity is
perhaps the most difficult and time consuming process for cost
estimators. Factors such as where research and development
ends and where production begins is a matter of considerable
judgement. The MQT date for aircraft engines and first flight
date for aircraft seem to be the least ambiguous estimates of
this point. Costs of producing an engine or aircraft to meet
their respective requirements may logically fall into the
research and development phase. However, it may be just as
reasonable to allocate these to production costs. Thus some
judgement is required to keep these costs comparable among
contractors.
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The recent requirements for minimizing life cycle
costs puts an additional subjective measure on cost
estimating. Certainly pre-planned product improvements (P 3 I)
may add substantial costs to the initial versions of a weapon
system, but in the long run they reduce the cost of what may
have been expensive modifications. The question then becomes
how can the cost of research and development of the P 3 I be
properly allocated between the initial system and its later
improved versions? Attempting to quantify these short term
costs which have their basis in long term designs adds another
measure of variance to the total cost equation.
3 . Schedule Networks
The development of any weapon system is comprised of
a network of precedence related elements or activities. The
duration of each element is a function of resources such as
labor, materials, equipment, and money. By definition, one or
more of these paths through the elements must be critical.
That is to say that any delay in one of these critical
elements, will cause a delay in the overall project.
Similarly, any reduction in the duration of a critical element
may cause a shortening of the overall project.
There are normally three durations when describing a
pro ject--what the government thinks (or requires) it should
be, what the contractor believes it will take, and finally,
what the negotiated agreement states it will be. Along with
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the negotiated duration, there is also an associated cost. If
the negotiated agreement is longer than what the contractor
believes it should take, there is an implied slack in the
contractor's schedule. Theoretically, if this is the case,
schedule compression imposed on the contractor would have no
real effect on the price to the government. Even if the
schedule is compressed beyond the point that the contractor
believes the project should take, he still may have latitude,
without increasing costs, in reassigning resources (manpower,
equipment, etc.) to those activities on the critical path.
However, one must keep in mind that there are opportunity
costs for the contractor. The resources diverted to one
project may adversely impact upon several others in terms of
cost, time, or both. Schedule stretchout also implies
opportunity costs for the contractor. Idle equipment,
inefficient utilization of manpower, and cost of money are
very real effects of stretching out a project. It is
precisely the difficulty in analyzing and quantifying those
opportunity costs for one, let alone many contractors, which
makes estimating a cost-schedule tradeoff function so
difficult
.
4 . Funding Instability
Funding instability is perhaps the most nebulous in
its impact on system acquisitions. One Rand report states:
No major acquisition program can be planned and managed
with high efficiency if it faces frequent and
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unpredictable changes in year-by-year program funding and
production scheduling, even if total program funding
eventually reaches the originally planned amount.
Schedule slippage and cost growth are the closely related
and mutually reinforcing effects of program funding
instability. (Dews, et al . , 1979, p. xi)
The effect of unpredictable funding is to increase the
risk to the contractor that planned purchases will not occur
or that the program may be canceled entirely. This short term
budget focus makes long term efficient and effective planning
difficult, if not impossible. Cost estimating relationships
have not been able to take into account the effect uncertain
budgets have on schedule slippage and cost growth.
5 . Risk
The idea of risk management in defense acquisition is
not a new one. Both performance risk and schedule risk have
cost-measurable implications. Therefore, risk-oriented
tradeoffs are both possible and desirable from program
management perspective.
Many developments are on the cutting edge of
technology and as such, it would be unfair to place all the
risk of such a development solely on a contractor.
Recognizing this, the acquisition community has adopted
several types of cost sharing or incentive type contracts.
Thus, the selection of a particular contract type influences
the amount a weapon system will cost. Without specific
information regarding the type of contract used, and its
attendant risk, the cost of that risk ultimately gets hidden
48
in some other variable in the cost equation. When data on two
otherwise similar weapon systems are compared, the use of
different contract types implies different costs, and by
extension, different tradeoff possibilities.
6 . Baselines
The Concept, Development, and Production Baselines,
approved at Milestones I, II, and III, respectively, set out
key objectives for cost, schedule, and performance parameters
(DODINST 5000.2, 1991, p. 11-A-l) . These objectives, within
certain tradeoff limits (thresholds) must be met in order to
reach the next Milestone. Cost estimating relationships which
seek to quantify the tradeoff relationships in either
development or production can not hope to describe the many
different sets of tradeoff options available during each
phase. Data is not sufficiently available at these levels to
quantify a tradeoff relationship for each phase. Instead, the
data must be aggregated across Milestones—the effect being
that there is an additional measure of uncertainty when a
tradeoff equation is applied at one particular Milestone or
during one particular phase. To put it another way, the
tradeoff options during the Demonstration and Validation Phase
and the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase are
quite different. One equation applied to both must
necessarily be a compromise between the two.
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A second point regarding the use of baselines is
highlighted by the growth models presented in Chapter II. One
thing that must be kept in mind, particularly when referring
to schedule or cost growth, is the original estimate. Many
studies which attempt to show trends in cost or schedule
growth use ratios of actual to estimated. The problem here is
quite obvious: which one is really being measured, the quality
of the estimate or the trend in actual data? Does a high
growth rate reflect spiraling costs or just a bad estimate?
An overly conservative estimate would, other things being
equal, yield a lower growth rate. Two things compound this
problem. First, estimates at completion are constantly
updated, and second, different organizations use different
bases. It is often difficult to discern which base or




Given all of the above mentioned problems, the question
remains as to whether or not any progress has been made in
quantifying the cost-schedule-performance tradeoff surface.
Certainly, cost-performance models have been improved over the
years but this is largely a function of improvements in
program data tracking and a larger database. Cost-schedule
and schedule-performance models have not, unfortunately,
evolved to a point where their estimating effects are
50
significant. The inclusion of a technology parameter in the
form of time is a first step in quantifying a cost-schedule-
performance relationship.
In this research, the author did not set out to exclude
any types of systems from consideration. In fact, any model
which attempted to introduce schedule (time) into a cost-
performance relationship would have been compiled and
explained, whether or not it described a weapon system.
However, this research was quickly focused on aircraft engines
and airframes simply because these were the only two which
included some measure of time.
The possibility that airframe cost estimating
relationships will improve in the near future is severely
limited. There is a hope that new variables will somehow
improve the existing estimates but these new variables will
most certainly be more complex than the parameters of weight
and speed. Thus, there appears to be no simple way, given the
data available today, to quantify accurately and reliably the




"One of the most difficult aspects of planning military
procurement would be overcome if a satisfactory method could
be found for estimating costs incurred by increased
specifications." (Arrow, 1950, p. 2) No one since has stated
the problem any more clearly. Many have attempted to quantify
the cost of increased specifications. The literature is
abundant with cost /performance models for items ranging from
reconnaissance drones to jet fighters. Relatively new to the
end user, statistical packages enable anyone to "invent" cost
estimating relationships for their particular area of
interest. The purpose of this thesis was not to review and
describe the myriad of cost relationships for each type of
platform. Instead, its primary focus was to compile and
explain those models which incorporated schedule along with
cost and performance. A careful review of the models
described in this thesis will show that only five* equations
out of all those presented explicitly had a measure of
development time as an explanatory variable. Many others,
however, incorporated a time-based measure of the technology.
Either approach allows tradeoffs** to be made between
*Equations (18) through (21) and equation (35) . Note
that in equation (35) , development time was found not to be
significant as an explainer of cost.
**Within the respective range of accuracy.
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schedule, cost, and performance. The wide ranges of data or
the small sample sizes do not lend themselves to the levels of
significance required for use by a program manager for
possible tradeoffs on specific weapon systems. These
equations are sufficient for long range planning and possible
ranking of alternative designs with respect to expected costs.
A. FUTURE RESEARCH
As discussed in Chapter V, it is the opportunity cost of
the unchosen alternative that is so difficult to quantify. A
possible method for estimating these costs could be obtained
by analyzing contractual changes (modifications) due to
performance changes or schedule changes. It is well known
that there are typically many modifications to each contract.
Some involve schedule extensions while others modify
performance parameters. It is possible that a relationship
may exist between the dollar amounts of modifications and the
reason for that modification. Take, for example, a government
caused delay which requires a modification to the contract.
There is some negotiated cost that is ultimately assigned to
that delay. Over a full range of contracts and contractors,
there may be a sufficient database to develop a cost per time
estimate. Data gathering may be quite a task, but agencies
such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency may be able to
provide some assistance.
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The studies reviewed in the course of this thesis all
revolve around research and development and production costs
and schedules. Operating and support and disposal costs have
since become more available. It now may be possible to
incorporate these costs into equations to quantify procurement
tradeoffs to minimize weapon system life-cycle costs.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix contains selected regression equations which
include a measure of technological trend as presented by
Alexander and Nelson. (Alexander and Nelson, 1972, p. 21)
Best Equation (semi-logarithmic)
Tech= -1187.5 +1561n(Temp) +18 . 81n (Thrust) -26.51n(Wgt)
-20.61n(SFC) +11.71n(Q) +13.0(Prop) (1)
R2=.903 SE=9.6
Linear
Tech= -77.1 + .077 (Temp) +. 00066 (Thrust) -.006 (Wgt)
-34.4(SFC) +.0094(Q) +1.77 (Prop) (2)
R2=.832 SE=12.6
Cruise variables
Tech= -1501.8 +2131n(Temp) +. 861n (Thrust*) -8.41n(Wgt)
-27.6n(SFC*) -3.101n(Q*) -24.3(Prop) (3)
R2=.835 SE=12.5
Date of first flight
Flight= -1245.6 +163 . 71n (Temp) +20 . 71n (Thrust)
-29.21n(Wgt) -20.31n(SFC) +11.71n(Q) +11.8 (Prop) (4)
R2=.8 91 SE=10.7
Pure performance
Tech= -38.9 +33.4 In (Thrust) -39.01n(Wgt)




Tech= -1121.9 +152 . 91n (Temp) +18 . 61n (Pressure)
-7.17 In (Airflow) +16.0 (fan) (6)
R2=.831 SE=12.4
Where:
Airflow= Total airflow through engine (lb/sec)
Fan = Dummy variable; 1 if turbofan, else 0.
Flight = Date of first flight (4th quarter 1942 =1)
Tech = Quarters to MQT; (4th quarter 1942 = one)
.
Temp = Turbine inlet temperature; Degrees Rankine.
Thrust = Military sea level static thrust; Lbs.
Wgt = Engine weight; Lbs.
SFC = Specific fuel consumption at military sea
level static thrust; (Lb/hr) /Lb thrust.
Q = Maximum dynamic pressure; lb/ft^2.
Prop = Dummy variable; one if turboprop, zero
otherwise
.
Pressure = Overall pressure ratio.
* = indicated parameter at cruise speed
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APPENDIX B - PRICE INDICES
PRICE LEVEL ADJUSTMENT INDEX* FOR AIRCRAFT ENGINES
YEAR INDEX YEAR INDEX
1946 3.824 1960 1.832
1947 3.623 1961 1.779
1948 3.289 1962 1.718
1949 3.185 1963 1.672
1950 3.012 1964 1.618
1951 2.703 1965 1.577
1952 2.577 1966 1.506
1953 2.513 1967 1.462
1954 2.439 1968 1.370
1955 2.348 1969 1.292
1956 2.232 1970 1.220
1957 2.128 1971 1.147
1958 1.992 1972 1.064
1959 1.894 1973 1.000
This index is based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data
for average hourly earnings of production workers in the
aircraft engine industry.
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APPENDIX C - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
This annotated bibliography attempts to provide references
in addition to those cited in the body of the thesis which
have either theoretically or quantitatively described the
relationship between or among the three variables of cost,
schedule, and performance.
A. THEORETICAL WORKS AND GROWTH MODELS
1. Peck, M. J., and Scherer, F. M. , The Weapons
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis , The
President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1962.
This 736 page book describes the overall nature of the
weapon system acquisition process. In particular, it
describes the theory behind the production possibilities
curves as a function of input resources and the conceptual
foundations of tradeoffs between and among those resources.
2. Zschau, E. V. W. , Project Modelling: A Technique For
Estimating Time-Cost-Performance Trade-offs in System
Development Projects (RM-5304-PR) , The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca
.
, July 1969.
Zschau outlines a methodology for estimating time-
cost-performance tradeoffs. The theoretical model he proposes
is an extension of the common linear programming approach;
namely, that each set of desired system output parameters can
be described as some function of the vast combination of input
variables and constraints. Problems associated with the
interdependence of the input variables and the nonlinearity of
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equations have limited the applicability of this modelling
approach.
3. Payne, I. S., Investigation of the Short Range Cost
Impact of Program Stretchout , Graduate Paper, Air
Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH, September 1975.
Payne examines the impact of program schedule on cost
from the corporate financial perspective. The effects of
program stretchout on several cost categories are
investigated. Those categories include fixed, direct,
indirect, overhead, and opportunity costs as well as the
effect of reduced overhead allocation bases.
4. Asher, N. J., and Maggelet, T. F., On Estimating the
Cost Growth of Weapon Systems (P-14 94) , Institute for
Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Va
.
, June 1980.
This paper documents schedule and cost growth in then
current major weapon system acquisition programs which had
attained initial operating capability. Note: Two other
studies on this subject were cited in Chapter II.
5. Glover, W. L., and Lenz, J. O., Cost Growth Model for
Weapons System Development Programs , Graduate Paper,
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson
AFB, OH, August 1974.
In this work, a model is presented which attempts to
express final development costs as a rat'.o of initial cost
estimates to program entropy. Here, entropy is defined as a
measure of uncertainty or a lack of order in the information
available to the program manager. The measure of entropy is
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based on subjective, personal probability statements from
experts in the field.
6. Naval Underwater Systems Center, Cost/Schedule Growth
Prediction Methodology (NUSC-TR-8435) , Newport, RI,
October 1989.
The theme of this report was the occurrence of risk in
research and development and initial production phases of the
weapon system acquisition process. The probabilities of
various risks are combined to quantify cost and schedule
growth.
B. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
1. Mullineaux, R. W., and Yanke, M. A., Proposed
Methodology for the Estimation of Jet Engine Costs in
the Early Phases of the Weapons System Acguisition
Process , Graduate Paper, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, June 1976.
This study found that in addition to performance
variables, raw material related variables were highly
correlated with system cost. It also investigated and
recommended the use of confidence intervals when estimating
system costs.
2. Shishko, Robert, Technological Change Through Product
Improvement in Aircraft Turbine Engines (R-1061-PR)
,
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca
.
, May 1973.
This work is a continuation and extension of Alexander
and Nelson's 1972 report which is described in Chapter III.
The concept of technological advance is investigated for a set
of engines which went through product improvement. The study
found that these growth engines displayed less technological
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advance and generally lower development costs than did newly
designed engines.
3. Hess, R. W. , and Romanoff, H. P., Aircraft Airframe
Cost Estimating Relationships : All Mission Types (N-
2283/1-AF) , The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca.,
December 1987.
This work is a companion note to the 1987 work by the
same authors which is cited in Chapter IV. It provides the
detailed results of the cost estimating relationships for
aircraft airframes of all mission types.
4. Blalock, C. D., Analysis of Schedule Determination in
Software Program Development and Software Development
Estimation Models , Graduate Paper, Air Force Institute
of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, September
1988.
This work analyzed five software development models
and compared estimates to actual results. Cited were twelve
factors which most commonly impact on software delivery
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